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Reflections from inside a toxic city

 $A \, programme \, to \, reduce \, stubble \, burning \, would \, have \, far \, greater \, positive \,$ externalities than many schemes ongoing today

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ssor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy and was a member of the Fourteenth Finance Commission.

iving as I do in the capital city of Delhi, breathing its toxic air, what's more appropriate to write about than the recent spike in Delhi's air pollution? Writing about it is less depressing than hinking about the file years whave already lost or, more important, the file years that our chillenean algrandchildren will lose if we continue olive in such toxicity. Twenty years ago when my co-authors U, shankar, Shekhar Mehta and I published our nonograph Controlling Pollution. Incentives Aud Legalation (Sage Publications India, New Delhi, 1997), the economies of pollution cornrol was till larged an unknown subject in India though rashsantial filerature already existed abroad. Lowever, an environment regulation and monograpae. Cost for east pollution, air pollution of an overall Environment Protection Act. An administrative framework to enforce the Acts and also been established, consisting of the Cenal Pollution Control Board and similar state-evel boards.

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The boards had fairly wide powers to impose senalties, ranging from levies and fines to cloure of polluting sources and even imprisonment. A rudimentary system for monitoring polution was also already in place.

In the past two decades much has changed, the economics of pollution control is now a lourishing such discipline within the burgeoning field of environment studies. Air quality monitoring has also become quite sophisticated vith continuous monitoring of a whole vector of ollution indicators and readings available, along with an air quality index (AQD, on a daily was from multiple city locations. However, the egulatory framework has remained largely inchanged, still dependent on the "command and control" (C&C) approach instead of market-sost dinstruments (MBD. The same faital flaw had rendered the pollution control Acts meficitive 20 years agostill applies today.

This is the disconnect between the ambient air and water quality standards laid down in the Acts and the source-specific standards which are the only standards that can actually be enforced for the Acts. The consequences are there for ill to see. Emission levels from individual source own progressively alterstandards were not analysed in source and the post of the content of the

This was already evident and reported in our sook 20 years ago. Since then the number of facories has grown manifold, millions of vehicles are been added on to Delhi Sraoks and pollution levels have long crossed all critical red lines. Juring the past week Delhi is experiencing a solution emergency, For the main pollutant of oncern, usupended particulate matter SPM) he ambient pollution load has been about 7-10 imes the specified standard and the overall AQI swell past the danger level.

A 2016 ITT (Indian Institute of Technology) A 2016 IIT (Indian Institute of Technology). Rampurstudy, generally seen as the most authoritative source on air pollution in Delhi, estimated pollution levels for a whole vector of pollutants in different parts of the city. For SPM of size 10 micrograms, exulie meter rung (ey um), it dentified the four main sources of pollution as road dust (56%), concrete batching (10%), industrial emissions, including power plants and municipal solid waste burning (10%), and motor vehicles (6%). For SPM size 2.5 meg cut un, the four leading with the control of the cont



Merely enforcing vehicle-emission standards will not nelp to achieve air quality standards if the total number of without any limit

rewards. But that applies to most government programmes. It cannot justify avoiding a stubble burning reduction programme. In fact, such a programme would have far greater positive externalities than many schemes ongoing today. A more serious question is how such a programme could be funded without unduly burdening the fise. Since the National Capital Region (NCR) would be a major beneficiary of the programme, the Central government should lead with a centrally sponsored scheme, partnering with concerned states on a cost-sharing basis. The Central share could be financed by cutting poorly targeted non-merit subsidies, like on fertilizers or kerosene. The states share could be similarly financed by cutting their tax expenditures and non-merit subsidies, like on power.

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power.

The NCR states should also cooperate on programmes for cross-border industrial emissions. The traditional approach is to close down polluting units. While helpful, such C&C policies also encourage 'inspector raj' and rent seeking. A combination of penalties for dirty technologies

and rewards for adoption of clean technologies may be the best way forward to give the right incentives without a high fisacl cost.

Industrial emission is also an important internal source of pollution within Delhi as shown by the HT-Kampur study, hence the same approach could be adopted by the Delhi government within its own jurisdiction. In several advanced countries established carbon credit markets help todiscover the market clearing price to support at great countries established carbon credit markets help todiscover the market clearing price to support at great carbon cap. However, it would be premature to jump to such as ophisticated system in India. It may be prudent to first establish a fiscal penalty-reward system, then gradually introduce a pollution of the properties of the proper